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Abstract—Domain Name Service (DNS) resolution is a 
mechanism that resolves the symbolic names of networked 
devices to their corresponding Internet Protocol (IP) address. 
With the emergence of the document that describes an 
extension to a DNS service definition, it was becoming 
apparent that DNS implementations will need to comply with 
some modified DNS behaviour. One such modification is that 
the DNS continues to use the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) to 
transmit DNS payloads that are longer than 512 bytes. Until 
the emergence of the Extension DNS (EDNS) specification, 
DNS servers would switch over from UDP to Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) if the response payload was larger 
than 512 bytes. With the new EDNS capability, it was required 
that DNS replies would continue to provide responses as UDP 
datagrams even though the response was larger than 512 bytes. 
To the author’s best knowledge, there are no academic articles 
dealing with the assessment of the DNS servers against EDNS 
specification. This paper examines the level of compatibility for 
a number of public DNS servers for some popular internet 
domains. It also explores behaviour of some contemporary 
DNS implementations such as Microsoft Windows 2012, 2016 
and 2019 as well as Linux-based BIND in regards to the EDNS. 
Keywords- Domain Name Service; RFC 6891; EDNS; DNS Flag 
Day; UDP. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Domain Name System (DNS) is a system responsible for 
the device name resolution that translates symbolic names of 
devices into their corresponding IP address. These names are 
often referred to as Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDN) 
as they consist of the name of the specific device, usually 
appended with their belonging domain.  
DNS was developed to help humans navigate through 
media such as the internet where remembering the IP address 
would be too counter-intuitive and difficult. From the early 
days, DNS specification was devised to help software 
vendors develop and implement standardised operations 
aimed at resolving hostnames to their corresponding IP 
addresses. It was essential that various DNS implementations 
be capable of interoperating with each other to provide a 
seamless flow of name resolution across different 
authoritative domains. DNS is organized as a hierarchical 
structure with different owners across different domains.  
This is why a Request For Comment (RFC) 1035 [1] was 
developed as an initial step to help standardise the DNS 
behaviour. Among other provisions, RFC 1035 defined that 
UDP messages should not exceed 512 bytes. Over time, 
DNS has evolved and introduced advanced features in terms 
of additional types of records such as TXT and DNSSEC. 
These two record types were not existent in the time when 
RFC 1035 was defined. TXT and DNSSEC are examples of 
records which require the DNS response payload size that 
often times exceeds 512 bytes. TXT is a type of DNS record 
that contains an arbitrary string and is defined in the RFC 
1464 [3].  
DNSSEC is another DNS record type designed with 
security in mind. Its primary purpose is to allow verification 
that the domain that sourced certain internet traffic is indeed 
a genuine domain. The relevance of DNSSEC record is 
typical for e-mail servers that may check if the source 
domain of an email is not a spoofed or malicious domain 
under the control of an attacker. This makes the DNSSEC 
record a good means to counter-fight email spamming. 
DNSSEC was defined in the RFC 4033 [4]. At the same 
time, TXT and DNSSEC have become regular queries from 
DNS clients to DNS servers or between DNS servers 
themselves.  
There are some DNS operations such as Zone Transfer 
which require transmission over TCP. The reason why DNS 
Zone transfers use TCP protocol is that they transmit a lot 
more information than a simple UDP query. Zone transfer 
will usually transmit the content of the whole domain zone 
or a part of the zone. This means multiple records will be 
transmitted. TCP transmission is more reliable than UDP 
because TCP is a more reliable protocol which has an 
inherent mechanism to recover corrupted or lost network 
packets. UDP would need to rely on the application protocol 
to handle these transmission errors. Zone transfers occur 
between DNS servers of the same domain mostly to ensure 
that there is a fault tolerance in case a primary DNS server 
fails. The main objective of Zone Transfer is to ensure that 
all the zone records are transmitted to another designated 
DNS server. Even though it is possible to initiate zone 
transfer from an end-user DNS client, it is not considered a 
part of regular functionality that should be allowed. This is 
why many corporate policies will deny zone transfers 
initiated from end-user DNS clients and allow it only to and 
from the designated DNS servers. The new standard emerged 
to describe the details of how DNS should handle the packets 
whose size exceeded 512 bytes in the form of RFC 6891 [2].  
It was labelled as an Extension Mechanisms for DNS 
(EDNS(0)). 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Besides the RFC 6891 definition, there is little other 
research available that investigates the compliance of DNS 
servers against EDNS feature. One of the online tools that 
allows easy verification of your DNS server is the one that 
Internet System Consortium provides called EDNS 
compliance checker [5]. The main deficiency of the online 
tool is that you cannot use it to check your internal DNS 
servers, unless they are exposed to the internet.   
Another valuable resource that deals explicitly with 
EDNS issue is the “DNS Flag Day” campaign [6]. This 
campaign actively supports the alignment of public DNS 
servers with a number of standard behaviours, one of them 
includes EDNS compatibility.  DNS Flag day also maintain 
the repository on Github [7] with a number of code snippets.  
Internet System Consortium also maintains BIND DNS 
server [8]. BIND was one of the DNS server 
implementations whose EDNS compatibility was examined 
in this research. Microsoft also maintains their website 
dedicated specifically to EDNS compatibility [9]. The 
research had to include DNS client applications too, as both 
UDP and TCP sessions will be dependent on the specific 
DNS client capabilities. Prior to the testing, some initial 
research was aimed at the two most popular DNS client 
applications – “dig” [10] and “nslookup” [11], respectively.  
The research indicated some clear disadvantages of 
nslookup compared to dig [12][13][14]. There is little 
research available in terms of academic work that deals with 
the specific evaluation of DNS behaviour when UDP 
transmission deals with packets bigger than 512 bytes. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology designed for the EDNS compatibility 
assessment had to take into account several factors that were 
hypothesised to contribute to the overall DNS behaviour.  
One of the basic requirements was to test various DNS 
server software packages. To address this, the assessment 
included both Windows and Linux based DNS 
implementation, Microsoft DNS for Windows 2012, 2016 
and 2019 and Linux BIND 9, respectively. While this was 
easy to achieve in testing the locally controlled servers, it 
was much more challenging to find and identify different 
flavours of DNS server on the internet. While there are tools 
that allow fingerprinting and version identification of DNS 
servers, many of the public DNS servers will be operating 
behind firewalls or other traffic filtering devices that prevent 
reliable version detection.  
To address the challenge of covering multiple DNS 
software packages on the internet, the decision was made to 
run EDNS checks across several different internet domains. 
The assumption taken was that with multiple different 
internet domains, the results would be processed with 
different DNS server implementations.  
Another level of inspection was introduced that included 
both implementations of DNS servers in the local test 
environment and public DNS servers on the internet. The 
reason for testing local and internet DNS servers was an 
opportunity to compare and correlate results for both 
domains. This inspection would facilitate the identification 
of potential discrepancies in configuration between these 
two groups of servers. Since the DNS resolution process 
involves both DNS client application that sources the query 
and DNS servers that reply to query, it was necessary to 
inspect at least two different implementations of DNS 
clients.  
To facilitate multiple assessment criteria, two DNS 
client were used – “dig” [10] and “nslookup”[11]. While the 
“dig” client is implemented predominantly on Linux and 
UNIX operating systems, nslookup is equally present in 
both Windows and Linux-like operating systems. This is 
why “nslookup” was run from both Linux and Windows 
operating systems. Using two different DNS clients on two 
different operating systems allowed for potential detection 
of differences in behaviour that stems from the different 
operating system implementations. One more tool used to 
check the consistency of the results generated by nslookup 
and dig was the EDNS compliance checking engine run by 
isc.org and hosted on their website [5]. Even though the 
output of this automated checker was valuable, its 
continuous lack of availability during the test period 
excluded it from the analysis of the results. 
IV. RESULTS  
The results of the EDNS compliance are summarised in 
the Table 1 shown below. 
  
Domain Number 
of DNS 
servers 
per 
domain 
EDNS(0) 
compliance 
nslookup 
EDNS(0) 
compliance 
dig 
Microsoft.com 5 No No 
Redhat.com 6 No Yes 
Oracle.com 6 No Yes 
Verizon.com 5 No Yes 
Isc.org 4 No Yes 
Local Windows 
2012 
1 No Yes 
Local Windows 
2016 
1 No Yes 
Local Windows 
2019 
1 No Yes 
Local BIND 9 
Linux 
1 No Yes 
Table 1 EDNS compliance of some DNS implementations 
 
The first column labelled “Domain” indicates the internet 
domain that was inspected. The column “Number of DNS 
servers per domain” indicates the number of DNS servers 
that were found authoritative for this particular domain.  
This number is not equal for every domain as a 
different number of secondary DNS servers can be defined, 
as the domain owner deems appropriate. The number of 
DNS servers per domain will be equal to the number of 
Name Server (NS) records defined per domain. The last four 
rows show locally installed Windows DNS and Linux DNS 
servers. Having locally installed DNS server is the reason 
why there is only one server per domain. All queries run via 
dig in the test were against TXT and DNSSEC. Nslookup 
queried only for TXT records. The reason for this difference 
is that nslookup does not support queries against DNSSEC 
records. The main event in the DNS session that determined 
the switchover from UDP to TCP transmission was observed 
which sets the flag in the application layer indicating the 
message is truncated. This is shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1 Truncated bit set in the DNS payload 
 
This truncated bit will be set in the UDP packet and by 
inspecting the session logic in the network sniffer, one can 
see that the session continues with establishing the TCP 
connection between the client and the server. Note that the 
DNS client will automatically initiate TCP handshake 
connection with DNS server after it detects the truncation. 
This TCP switchover is shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2 TCP handshake initiation after the Truncated bit 
 
Note the “SYN” flag in the initial TCP handshake sent to 
destination port 53 (DNS).  
Most online servers’ responses confirmed they are 
EDNS compliant but only if dig is used as a client 
application. The only exception here is Microsoft DNS 
servers which failed to comply to EDNS irrespective of the 
DNS client used. The indication of the truncated DNS 
message is displayed in the output from the “dig” in Figure 2 
below. 
 
 
Figure 3 output from dig client during the assessment of a public 
DNS indicating non-compliance with EDNS 
 
All offline lab servers’ responses were EDNS compliant, but 
only if dig was used as a DNS client. Nslookup returned the 
non-compliant responses for all the servers, including local 
and online. The EDNS checker was not available all the 
time during the assessment despite its valuable results and is 
therefore not included in the analysis of the results. 
V. SECURITY IMPLICATION OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
One potential issue of EDNS non-compliance is security 
related. Corporate security and firewall policies may dictate 
that only the UDP protocol is allowed for end-user DNS 
queries. End-user queries assume only the DNS queries 
sourced by end-user applications such as internet browsers, 
email clients, dig and nslookup. Even if the end-user queries 
for TXT or DNSSEC records that can exceed 512 bytes, the 
DNS response should still come via UDP protocol if the 
destination server is EDNS compliant. Therefore, the 
corporate firewalls may be configured to reject any DNS 
communication over TCP, except maybe between the 
primary and secondary authoritative DNS servers. If the end-
user client uses nslookup or the destination DNS server is not 
EDNS compliant and strict firewall rule is in place, the query 
will fail if the response payload exceeds 512 bytes. Such a 
firewall rule can then introduce an inadvertent denial of 
service where the name resolution process may fail.  .   
VI. RISK RATING  
The security implications of this non-EDNS compliant 
behaviour identified so far are related to the denial of 
service. The denial of service due to a firewall rule that does 
not permit TCP DNS will cause the end-user DNS queries to 
fail. The possible mitigation could allow the TCP 
transmission of DNS queries. While such a rule may relax 
somewhat the security posture of the company, no other 
attack vectors have been identified. One possible 
compensating measure for allowing DNS via TCP can be an 
IP based restriction configured on the DNS servers. This IP 
based restriction will allow the zone transfers only from 
predefined IP addresses. These predefined IP addresses will 
belong to the company’s approved and trusted DNS servers 
only.  
The risk rating proposed for this EDNS non-compliance 
is Medium to Low.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper demonstrated that even though the Extension 
DNS (EDNS(0)) mechanism has been established as the 
mandatory requirement for DNS implementations, there are 
some caveats causing the lack of compliance. One of the 
causes is using the nslookup DNS client. Nslookup is 
nowadays an obsolete DNS client which lacks some 
important capabilities, but is still widely used. Another cause 
for EDNS non-compliance is that some public DNS servers 
do not support EDNS(0) as demonstrated in the results 
section. Any discrepancy in implementing EDNS(0) 
compatibility may cause a denial of service due to the 
firewall rules that assume the compliance whereas some 
scenarios clearly demonstrate this is not always the case.  
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